How should ethicists respond to taboo sexual interactions? Are all such interactions morally impermissible? If not, what are the conditions under which such interactions are permissible? In this presentation, I argue that some taboo sexual interactions are, in fact, morally permissible. I rely on the assumption that sexual interactions should be judged on the basis of the same moral principles that non-sexual interactions are judged. The most important moral principles when it comes to judging personal interactions are harm and consent. When we apply these principles to sexual interactions, we find that many sexual interactions generally considered to be taboo are actually morally permissible. Next, I respond to an objection that states that this result can be used as a reductio against my preliminary assumption that sexual and non-sexual interactions should be judged on the basis of the same moral principles. Finally, I consider whether ethicists have a duty, on the basis of potential harm, to conceal the permissibility of these taboo sexual interactions.